Identidad del sujeto educativo en la narrativa de la responsabilidad social universitaria

Identity of the Educational Subject in the Narrative of the University Social Responsibility

Identidade do sujeito educativo na narrativa da responsabilidade social universitária

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Resumen
A cuenta de los contenidos del programa interinstitucional de responsabilidad social universitaria (RSU) de las instituciones de educación superior mexicanas, se busca reflexionar en el campo fenoménico de la construcción de las identidades de los universitarios como el lugar de articulación intersubjetiva y simbólica desde donde los proyectos profesionales devienen proyectos ciudadanos. Esta articulación se revisa aquí con los significados del sujeto, la moral y la ética para una cultura política contemporánea ausente y sin embargo necesaria para configurar el telón de fondo de algunas de las narrativas de la universidad como institución de y entre la vida pública. Se ha asumido levantar y transitar por un andamiaje de la filosofía hermenéutica de Paul Ricoeur hacia el campo de la antropología filosófica y la política social. El análisis queda orientado por la teoría de la identidad narrativa (Ricoeur) que apertura el espacio ontológico del cuidado, la estima y el respeto de sí que vigoriza el lugar desde donde se afirman los valores identitarios de la RSU para la vida democrática de las instituciones de educación superior.
Palabras clave: identidad narrativa, filosofía hermenéutica, política social, responsabilidad social universitaria, sujeto educativo.

Abstract

Based on the contents of the inter-institutional program of university social responsibility (USR) of Mexican higher education institutions, this article seeks to reflect on the phenomenal field of the construction of university identities as the place of intersubjective and symbolic articulation from which professional projects become citizen projects. This articulation is reviewed here with the meanings of the subject, morality and ethics for an absent contemporary political culture, nevertheless necessary to configure the backdrop of some of the narratives of the university as an institution of and among public life. It has been assumed to rise and transit through a scaffolding with the hermeneutic philosophy of Paul Ricoeur towards the field of philosophical anthropology and social policy. The analysis is guided by the theory of narrative identity (Ricoeur), which opens the ontological space of care, esteem and self-respect that invigorates the place from which the identity values of USR are affirmed for the democratic life of higher education institutions.

Keywords: narrative identity, hermeneutic philosophy, social policy, university social responsibility, educational subject.

Resumo

Por conta dos conteúdos do programa interinstitucional de responsabilidade social universitária (RSU) de instituições de ensino superior mexicanas, busca refletir sobre o campo fenomenal da construção das identidades universitárias como lugar de articulação intersubjetiva e simbólica a partir de onde o projetos profissionais tornam-se projetos cidadãos. Essa articulação é revisada aqui com os significados de sujeito, moral e ética para uma cultura política contemporânea ausente e, no entanto, necessária para configurar o pano de fundo de algumas das narrativas da universidade como instituição da e entre a vida pública. Supõe-se que ela erga e se mova através de um andaime da filosofia hermenêutica de Paul Ricoeur em direção ao campo da antropologia filosófica e da política social. A análise é orientada pela teoria da identidade narrativa (Ricoeur) que abre o espaço ontológico de
Introduction

[The university is conceived as a public space] of discursive, conceptual, political and why not, ideological and philosophical confrontations. The university is finally an amplified sounding board for the debates and conflicts of the environment of political society and civil society. (…) In this context, all social actors have an opinion about their goals and destiny (Gómez, 2017, p.149).

The approach to the formulation of some of the contents of the university social responsibility program (USR) of higher education institutions is put into perspective in the identity construction of university autonomy in articulation with the democratic life to which citizens and citizens aspire. society in public life. Its symbolic and discursive construction is validated here on the Aristotelian ethos thesis: "The good life with and for others in just institutions" (eudaimonia). This will be, throughout the implications of this review, the sustenance from which one starts and to which one returns.

Here, the good life opens the narrativity of the existential space (phenomenal-ontological) of the university subject that anticipates the other for its realization or effective life through the praxis of the substantive tasks of the university: teaching, research and extension, with intentionality ethics. This intention privileges a link with democracy that must be sought in the horizon of justice, and on which it tacitly talks about the ethical aspiration of the educational values enunciated in the USR program (emphasized here with a stronger educational responsibility for civic-professional life). On the other hand, this Aristotelian arrangement or disposition has a political establishment due to the narrative of the sui generis university autonomy of the public university in Mexico and its relationship with social action, whose validity is subscribed in a broader field linked to the construction of citizen and political identity of university students.
This identity is configured on a relational bundle of ethical evaluations with the institutions, in the permanence and discontinuity of the time of university life, which goes and returns from private to public: a prefigurative and refigurative movement available for interpretation, which travels equivocally in the institutional grid of a model of the Mexican State that seeks in the democratic discourse to affirm justice, that deliberates between a liberal governance (modern: freedom, equality, fraternity) and a neoliberal (market: exchange value, law of supply and demand, consumption, social networks) where the genuine values of "that other" of identities and of "the good life" of this century are exacerbated, overlapped or conjured up in the phenomenal appearance of postmodern life.

In this context, it is asked about the "political being-doing" of the institutions, and in a limited way, about the "being-doing of university autonomy". Then, it is hypothesized in an identity space that produces biases in the “ways of being”, of acting, or participating in “the good life”. Such biases are sought as a way to answer the following questions: how can higher education institutions be recognizable in the political life of university students? Can the USR program influence or ethically resist a polymorphism, absence or another way of being of the university political identity?

The theoretical references for this work come on account of the narrative identity of Paul Ricoeur (2003, 2004, 2006), a philosophical theory of personal identity, developed and extended to its ethical implications always and preferably hand in hand with Aristotle. From this, the narrative identity of oneself as another, the question of ethical interpellation that he calls solicitude, is driven in the discussion by some textual contributions from Mexican scholars and specialists (from the field of teaching and social science research and human) of this century; by theoretical frameworks of poststructuralist emphasis on hermeneutical philosophy and the intersubjectivity of discourse that prescribe the field of ethics and social politics, in general, and the construction of social identities and political discourse, in particular; and, of university stamp, for those paragraphs that we have chosen from narratives of public documents of the National Association of Universities and Institutions of Higher Education (Anuies) on the RSU program.

This approximation of texts, narratives and discourses seeks to indicate the constructive character of the empirical referent, which from the perspective of the political analysis of discourse aspires to a philosophical approach to the intricate limits of educational research, for reflection on some humanly available spaces in the place that confers on it, a
critical reflection of the political identity of university students and the symbolic-discursive suitability of democracy towards the proposals of educational policies and the transversality of USR in the study programs of higher education institutions Mexican.

**Method**

The speech made of words can only be true or false in the following sense: the opinion expressed in it about a state of affairs can be called into question (Gadamer, 1998, p. 15).

The aforementioned scaffolding runs through the perspective of political discourse analysis. Rosa Nidia Buenfil Burgos (2008), in “The intermediate category”, refers to it (by Torfing, Laclau and Mouffe) sustained in the historical, discursive and political character of being, therefore, she says, “of all identity, of the reality” (pp. 30-31). The political analysis of discourse is a discursive analytic "that involves, of course, research procedures that it takes up from various disciplines and with which it is constituting a 'toolbox'" (p. 30) and that departs from unguarded eclecticism epistemic. Buenfil (2008) adds that this analytic “pays special attention to the epistemic and ontological compatibility and / or compatibility of the intellectual tools it articulates, in search of the greatest possible consistency” (Buenfil, 2008, p. 30), which provides an access of educational research to the culturally and discursively mediated world; however, "not complete, not neutral and contestable to continue advancing in its production" (Buenfil, 2008, p. 31).

Taking into account the above, and in accordance with the ontological and epistemic positions of discursive political analysis, Buenfil (2008) offers a logic on the construction of the object of study for social research in general and educational research in particular, which is what here it is pursued. It establishes a dynamic model of intellectual constructs that interact, reversibly, with the theoretical reference in the participation of the object of study (as a phenomenon that takes place in a particular historical context). These constructs, he affirms, are validated by the “traces of subjectivity” of the researcher; of its historical, contextual or situated particularity when settling in that "culturally and discursively mediated" world in which we are always and each time faced with an epistemological position: the empirical referent that is of the same subjective nature as the questions directed by the researcher, and an analytical bridge, in epistemological coherence (surveillance) of its elements, available for the discursive political analysis established through categories.
It is these analytical categories (which Buenfil [2008] prevents, they are not an analogy of the Aristotelian or Kantian ones) that are subscribed here as narratives and that will update the circle of interpretation (hermeneutic), unifying and integrating the meaning of the object of study in question: RSU Narratives, University Autonomy Narratives, University Life Temporality Narratives, Ethical Subject Narratives, Identity Narratives and University Citizenship Narratives, and which, as intermediate categories of discursive political analysis, produce here the connection lines for the analysis of education in this work:

A figure of intellection of intermediate scope, an analytical image that assembles the theoretical generality with the historical particularity (...), produces lines of connection between the critical frame and the empirical reference (...), which (...) involves the examination of the notions recovered from philosophy, political theory, psychoanalytic theory, etc., for use in the analysis of education (Buenfil, 2008, p. 32).

As a figure of "intermediate" intellection, the critical frame that is deployed in this work brings into contact notions recovered from philosophy and political theory, whose epistemic connection lines are a bundle of narratives that make possible their own particularity of hermeneutical analysis of the ethical dimensions of the university subject in the political configuration of the USR, without scope of "a positivity" due to its relational and constructive perspective:

This figure of intellection is constructed ad hoc, and what is an intermediate category for one object of study may not be so for another. In other words, it is an analytical tool that depends on its relationship with the object under construction and does not have its own positivity or autonomy. (Buenfil, 2008, p. 33).

The lines of epistemic connection are validated by a "minimal" hermeneutics. From the perspective of the interpretation theory of Paul Ricoeur (2003), there is a proposition in favor of a “productive distancing” with the cultural distance of some concepts of a historicist nature that are considered and reviewed here and that are part of the discursive access ("Intellectual tools" of discursive political analysis) of this work.¹ Ricoeur proposes for this

¹ La teoría interpretativa de Ricoeur centra su importancia en el discurso (el lenguaje como discurso): el discurso como dialéctica de acontecimiento y sentido: “el acontecimiento es la experiencia entendida como expresión, pero es también el intercambio intersubjetivo en sí, y la comunicación con el receptor” (...). La experiencia
hermeneutic of discourse interpretation a hermeneutical circle articulated with the dialectic of explanation and understanding. Understanding as conjecture and explanation as validation of the act of discourse that, from its phenomenological perspective, is intentional. Analogously to the intentional (phenomenological) act of all the phases of the hermeneutic circle, the so-called narratives have been put as discursive arguments that thematize (explain) some new conjectural meaning as "meaning of a proposition" (Ricoeur, 2003, pp. 101-102).² The Ricoeurean hermeneutical circle culminates (but does not close) in the act of appropriation as "the transfer of discourse to a sphere of ideality that allows an indefinite expansion of the sphere of communication" (Ricoeur, 2003, p. 103).

The existential concept of appropriation of making what was previously foreign one's own continues to be the final goal of the hermeneutic circle as "updating of meaning when it is addressed to someone" (Ricoeur, 2003, p. 103), and whose intention is the appropriation of the "Project of a world": new forms of life that give the subject (the one who writes a text and the one who reads it) a new capacity to know himself (Ricoeur 2003, p.106). This sphere of discursive ideality is woven here through the application of the hermeneutical circle and is intended to validate the route (explanation) and the conjectural synthesis for "some" and not definitive interpretation of the ethical and moral dimensions in the political configuration of university subjects as a project of a world that gives some sense to "know oneself" in the background, in the here and now, in the narrative of the RSU.

We anticipate with Ricoeur that this does not imply that in the interpretive process there is finally no meaning of truth or knowledge: “This is obtained provided that the goal of interpretation is met, [its appropriation], which consists of sharing one's interiority with others” (Ricoeur, 2003, p. 11).

² Desde la fenomenología de Husserl, la noción de sentido (sinn ideal de Frege) todas las realizaciones psíquicas, no solo a los actos lógicos, sino también a los actos perceptuales, volitivos y emocionales. Para lograr una fenomenología objetiva, todo acto intencional sin excepción.
Discussion

The theoretical reference, the theory of narrative identity in itself as another, is dear to the philosopher Paul Ricoeur (2003), who, from anthropological philosophy, considers it “never finished”. Accordingly, identity derives from the knowledge of man by asking not “what” (from the Cartesian tradition) but “who is man” (closer to Nietzsche and Heidegger). His method of analysis: hermeneutic phenomenology, where the unfolding of narrative identity looks for the one who transits (unfinished) through the action, the person, the time and the place from where this (the who) is enunciated in a discursive space of their identification and recognition. In this intricate ontological space, the narrative identity makes an interpretative synthesis of the capacity and power of human language, in its symbolic and metaphorical character of culture, from which it nevertheless takes its richness and identity complexity. From these considerations, saying I with Ricoeur implies, each time, enunciating (oneself) one self as another.

The object of study outlined here privileges the guiding character of narrative identity in the drift of university time: of the voice embodied in a body: “my body that enunciates”, in a time and place, ontology of a university I am\(^3\) that extends through language as an action to an “I want”, “I can”, “I narrate”, “I am responsible”, as care, esteem and respect of being a university student in and between the world of public life; in which educating, educating ourselves, educating ourselves in the university educational praxis, must be, each time, enunciating (oneself) as another in an ethical framework: "A just social action, because it seeks to socialize in an equitable and supportive way through legitimized knowledge publicly ”(Cullen, 2008, cited in Soledad, November 6, 2009).

The narrative identity proposal, although it affects human time, finds in the narrative mode the one who “describes, narrates and prescribes” the world, configuring some meaning for personal and public life with others. The narrative configuration (called by Ricoeur mimesis II because of the composition of human actions that occurs in the narrative) operates as a discursive mediation of human action.\(^4\) The configuration is considered as the function

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\(^3\) Algunos emblemas quedan sustentados en ese “ser universitario” con las frases de identidad como “somos Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro (UAQ)”, “orgullosamente universitario” “Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León (UANL)”, etc.

\(^4\) Mimesis II es aquí la construcción de la trama tomada de la tragedia (acciones de los personajes) de la lectura de la Poética de Aristóteles con la que Ricoeur instituye un círculo hermenéutico de triple mimesis: configuración (mimesis II), prefiguración (mimesis I) y refuguración (mimesis III, del relato que aquí nos
of rupture: it opens the world of the composition of the fabric of personal or collective identity. Configuration or mimesis II, has an intermediate position between two operations, between mimesis I and mimesis III, which constitute, respectively, the before and after mimesis II (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 114). In this way, the narrative configuration assumes the task of “transfiguring the before into after by its configuration power” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 114).

By going to the "world of composition" of the conceptual network of the substantive tasks of higher education institutions, one of its temporary articulations can be located in the validity of the work put into narrative (culture, science, knowledge) in the field of the public space of the educational institution, which, in general, is delimited by legal and administrative frameworks. These frameworks discursivize with university autonomy its relationship with the State, with the internal constitution of the university and its functions; frameworks ranging from organic law in coherence with regulations, educational models, etc.; and specifically, and within the university, with the discourses that enhance the educational act (situated and contextualized) in coherence with the conceptual network of skills, attitudes and values that define the profiles of admission, academic trajectory and of graduation from the study plans (and their “traces of subjectivity” in the hidden curriculum), in coherence with the narrative of their missions and visions: all of them considered here as “human actions that occur in the narrative”.

It is incumbent on hermeneutics, says Ricoeur (2004):

Reconstructing the set of operations by which a (narrative) work rises on the opaque background of living, acting and suffering, to be given by the author to a reader who receives it and thus changes his or her work (p. 114).

And he continues: “We therefore follow the passage of a prefigured time to another refigured through the mediation of a configured one. (…) Temporality is brought into language to the extent that it configures and refigures temporal experience ”(p. 115). There the conceptual network is used as a character of temporality. The actions refer to reasons that explain why someone does or has done something, and, agents responsible for some consequences of their actions, what they are capable of doing in such circumstances (good
or against adversity). Thus, a relationship of intersignification is established for practical understanding (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 114).

A configuration (mimesis II) opens here the fabric of university identity, supported by a conceptual ethical-political network of public space that engenders university life projects and updates the substantive tasks of higher education institutions, whose refiguration (mimesis III) It would be raised in the reading of the RSU that aspires to change the ethical “work” of the institution: commitment in the development of its environment, and fosters the capacities of students as responsible citizens in the professional field, in that of cultural consumption and political, in the extension and dissemination of science and its scientific and technological knowledge, among others.

The RSU has different meanings, among them, the faculty that higher education institutions have to disseminate and put into practice a set of principles and values that affect the resolution of the community’s needs, that is, the commitment that the community adopts. institution in the development of its environment, which includes an ethical dimension, fostering the capacities of students as responsible citizens.

The challenge for higher education institutions is aimed at designing and applying a model that responds to the different dimensions of social responsibility, which integrates training, research, and social management of knowledge in a socially responsible campus. (Pérez y Vallaeys, 2016, p. 13).

Access now to the discursive space of the identification and recognition of USR in the field of educational policies opens an emerging call for ethics on the part of higher education institutions. In its current configuration, the narrative of these institutions foresees a challenge towards commitment in the drift of university time as a publicly legitimized just social action. From this, social responsibility approaches are sought to the life project of university students who become in time in a narrative mode: “Time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated in a narrative mode, and the narrative reaches its full significance when it becomes a condition of temporary existence (Ricoeur, 2004, p.113).
Analysis

RSU Narratives

This work starts from one of the emerging discussions of the broad ethical-political context of higher education institutions: RSU, a new university management policy that, since 2000 (Vallaeys, 2014), emerges as necessary in the field of a broad region of shared socio-cultural identity that is developing in Latin America to “respond to the organizational and academic impacts of the university”, and seeks to depart “from both the traditional solidarity extension and a mere declarative unilateral commitment and oblige each university to put his epistemic assumptions and hidden curriculum are questioned” (Vallaeys, 2014, para. 1).

Particularly in the field of the Mexican university, Anuies has been promoting RSU challenges emanating from the proposals reviewed in the different discussion forums (Pérez and Vallaeys, 2016), whose corollary has shown the interest that higher education institutions Mexicans have to give greater social meaning to academic learning and the process of comprehensive training of students.

Although the educational praxis of higher education institutions bases its formative relevance on the lines of generation and application of knowledge, disciplinarity and research are interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary linked with other academic programs and professional areas of science, new technologies, art and culture that seek, together, an impact with relevance and social responsibility from all their actions and actors. Transversality in all curricula implies a strong relationship with RSU that looks towards a university professionalization by generating and disseminating socially relevant knowledge (Pérez and Vallaeys, 2016, p. 15) and the sustenance of university work within the framework of public institutions, which means basing their skills and abilities on an ethical dimension, and fostering the abilities of students as responsible citizens, as well as "forming conscious, innovative and caring citizens who through their profession add social value" (Pérez y Vallaeys, 2016, p. 40).

Faced with these commitments that interact with educational practice, a broader and more general humanistic background could be pointed out, between the identification of a supportive education with the symbolization of public culture, which crosses the "achievement of identity and social cohesion" that propose the guidelines of the RSU. A space of public power where there is a reflection between "being a university and" being a
professional "socially and politically committed, which can be extended to a primary sense of humanistic responsibility and the university as a permanently defensible right.

**Narratives of university autonomy**

The university ethos of the RSU, publicly legitimized, implies for this case to problematize the character of university autonomy that essentially (or by its very essence) refuses to subsume university activities to particular interests or directives of the State that demand legally unfounded links of responsibility, which which could be synthesized as a matter of struggle, conquest and historical pride (Díaz, 2004). There, university autonomy places a “relational difference” accent on the conglomerate of educational institutions. In this regard, Ángel Díaz Barriga (2004) mentions the following:

> Autonomy is part of what is considered the essence of the university. It cannot be conceived without a vision of autonomy. This makes it an institution different from all social institutions, even different from educational institutions. University students are proud of their autonomy. This appears as a conquest achieved as a consequence of achieving a different relationship with the State and with society. (p. 2).

Faced with this nuanced relational conjuncture with the State with an impact on society, its permanent struggle and conquest deserves an urgent reconfiguration and updating of the ethos of responsibilities and the scope that the relationship implies: a political update of the relational way that, through actors and agencies involved in the intricate substantive tasks of the university: teaching, research and extension, make up an educational act, which, however, originates, is integrated and impacts on social life. A relational mode of governance that has bypassed community action due to the political equity of its related parties: “University autonomy, as a form of government within the institution, but also as a form of relationship with local government authorities. Autonomy as a form of relationship between the university and the State” (Díaz, 2004, p. 3).

By questioning the relational mode of the social function of the university, privileged, in its being and doing from the university autonomy, the RSU opens the political debate.

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5 En el año de la publicación fungía como director de Estudios Estratégicos de la Anuies.
6 Intrincadas por la multiplicidad de formas de interacción e interconexión social a través del uso y alcance de las nuevas tecnologías, que compiten fuertemente en el debate de los modos presenciales del acto educativo.
Now it is urged (and in each historical context by which the public university as an institution becomes) a reflection of the limits and scope of an ethical nature in the horizon of responsibilities that are articulated with our citizen investiture\(^7\) (and the idea or construct that is held by citizenship) and its relationship with the State. It is there, at the locus of linking the social and the political, where there should be a reconfiguration for the understanding and scope of ethos with the community and society: of the knowledge of my rights and my (normative) obligations shared with and among the citizens, I can guide my contributions and democratic participation in the university; carry out citizen (ethical) actions for social contributions, where the institution of higher education appears in its dimension of integrating consciousness, where the values and ethical principles that privilege the political field of the institutions and the State in its social dimension materialize.

There is no political autonomy, as a disengagement from the processes that regulate the global project of the nation and the particular rules of a specific society.

The university is compelled to obey the global framework of the laws of a country, and the political forms that exist within a society (Díaz, 2004, p. 5).\(^8\)

It will then be desirable for higher education to be the means and end of its ethical principles and values, explicitly differentiated from a rationality of political and normative discourses configured by university students in their relationship with the State; a configuration such that emphasizes the relationality of autonomy in the materiality of its responsible actions in a space for insertion of the “active life” of USR. It should be clarified that active life is understood as the space for the synthesis of capacities and competencies for political organization. Gómez (2017) links both capacities and competencies with a Mexican university system that works under the adaptation of these to the labor market, and that must

\(^7\) En el campo político por ley devenida de la democracia nos hacemos ciudadanos a los 18 años, esta investidura ha quedado susceptible de ser suscrita (o ejercida) desde el registro de nuestro nacimiento, ante la institución civil.

\(^8\) “Las universidades tienen que cumplir con las normas de la Secretaría de Hacienda para su ejercicio presupuestal, de la Contaduría Mayor de la Cámara de Diputados. Todo ello, además, se encuentra de alguna forma vinculado con el presupuesto anual que fija la misma Cámara. (…) Desde las que emanan de la Ley de Profesiones, hasta las actuales exigencias de participar en procesos de acreditación de sus diversos programas. El establecimiento de sistemas de evaluación nacionales (como los programas de estímulos para los profesores de tiempo completo, o los exámenes de egreso de la licenciatura), así como los diversos programas que ha establecido la SEP para impulsar la denominada modernización de la educación superior en México (Díaz, 2004, pp. 5-6)
here go beyond the assignment of technical and professional roles and its scope of socialization of students to an area of public impact:

This distinction between the individual (competence) and / or collective (cooperation) will effectively have repercussions at the level of the political organization of students, teachers and workers when conflict situations arise from the presentation or implementation of modernization plans, updating, reforms, restructuring or the appearance of assemblies or general states or attempts to privatize the university by different means (Gómez, 2017, p. 143).

**Narratives of temporality of university life**

According to Gómez (2017), the temporality in which university life transits can be conceived in the following way:

A public space with open or restricted access, of massive cultural consumption or for specialists, of extension and dissemination of science and its knowledge, of scientific and technological offer applicable to the private, to the sphere of the State and civil society (p. 149).

However, how from the personal and collective are the discourses that occupy the significant narratives of political culture, science, knowledge and institutions in the public space of the university configured when time becomes human as a prefiguration of the professional vocation?

By definition, vocation appears later linked to work. Following mimesis I, its insinuation is hinted at in the foreshadowing of professional life projects. It is defined (in terms of expectation for admission to university) as an “inclination or interest that a person feels inside to dedicate himself to a certain way of life or a certain job” (Vidal, July 30, 2017, para. 1). And specifically, the professional vocation is "that inner call that human beings usually discover in the youth stage when the person decides that they want to train in a specific area in order to work in the future in a specific sector" (Nicuesa, January 2005, paragraph 2). In both definitions that circulate in the public sphere of the Internet, we would point out today the impossibility of a solipsism of that "inner call" and that it is "discovered" in youth: rather than discovery, it should be defined as an insistent question related to the happiness of professional life.
Likewise, the professional vocation is restricted to the symbolic and identity activity of the status quo\(^9\) of life projects, always in the making in the wide range of life models that are woven with the other areas of the social institution: family, community, school, health, religion, economy, the State. However, as a symbolic activity, the vocation is also intricate in a narrative that gives strength to our life discourses:

Symbolic activity suffers from a lack of autonomy. It is an activity that is confined, and it is the task of many disciplines to reveal the lines that tie the symbolic function with this or that non-symbolic or prelinguistic activity. (…) The symbol hesitates between the dividing line of the bios and the logos. (…).

It bears witness to the primordial way in which Discourse is rooted in Life. Born where strength and form coincide (Ricoeur, 2003, pp. 71-72).

With the lack of pre-university curricular activities and spaces destined to this de-symbolization of the vocation, it happens that, whether or not the motivations appear, the urgent formulation, disquisitions or protections to project as a professional arises on the eve of access to higher education. a world of work mediated and publicized by the symbols of public culture.\(^10\) Derived from this, a confrontation occurs with oneself and with others (family) that places “the decision” of future entry to a university or professional career through mechanisms of evaluation of the labor market, inflated by the economic and by useful professional roles personal: temporary constraints that move away from the preferential choices with which the time of the university school career deals\(^11\) and it impoverishes the understanding of the ethical scope of the vocation.

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\(^9\)De manera general, aquí, el *statu quo* estaría relacionado con “el estado de los hechos o de las cosas” en la percepción de los preuniversitarios, lo cual hace referencia a un estado emocional, social, político y/o económico de un período determinado de tiempo. El significado de *statu quo* dependerá del contexto. El tiempo y contexto del “estado de las cosas” es más el de una aspiración que el de una reflexión.

\(^10\) “Los símbolos como imágenes privilegiadas de un poema, o como aquellas imágenes que predominan en la obra de un autor o una escuela literaria, o las figuras recurrentes dentro de las cuales una cultura entera se retonoce a sí misma, o aun las grandes imágenes arquetípicas que la humanidad en general exalta, ignorando las diferencias culturales” (Ricoeur, 2003, p.66).

\(^11\) Existen algunas experiencias (Argentina y Brasil) con un sistema de año de bachillerato único preuniversitario. Todos los estudiantes que acreditaron la preparatoria deben cursar este año y, al acreditarlo, les da derecho a ingresar a la carrera y a la universidad que escojan en los límites de la capacidad anunciada y de acuerdo con el promedio obtenido. Lo anterior lleva a muchos jóvenes que no acreditan el año (lo pueden si quieren recursar) a estar seguros de que no quieren tener la experiencia universitaria, tanto porque no pudieron como porque no quieren vivir esa experiencia. Pueden igualmente acceder a otras opciones técnicas o semiprofesionales (Gómez, 2017, p. 165).
In a meticulous account of the current state of the Mexican university, Gómez (2017) emphasizes the aspirations of pre-university students and the admission mechanisms of university careers, governed by an institutionalized ethic where the offer of careers is related in the social sphere, mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, but mainly due to the supply and demand of certain careers in the labor market.

The foregoing opens a discussion to understand or try to adapt supply to demand through mechanisms for evaluating the labor market of the different careers or the assignment of roles in society. There is also a cross-section of information between individual aspirations, referring to "vocations" or preferences correlated with the most demanded careers. (Gómez, 2017, p.143).

However, to think of the symbols of public culture in analogy with Ricoeur would be to touch the coating of the vocation as an experience of ritual initiation of the high school students, which is subject to cultural processes inside and outside the institution. Thus, the entire experience is articulated in the public character of the significant articulation (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 120) of vocation and professional training and of reaching its achievement.

To understand a rite is to place it in a ritual, this in a cult and, progressively, in the set of conventions, beliefs and institutions that form the symbolic network of culture (Ricoeur, 2004, p.121).

What are those symbols of culture (impacted in the Mexican context by a liberal-neoliberal political culture) that mediate between vocation and professional training? What ethical and identity discourses for "the good life" would be available today for the interdiscursiveness of the educational act of higher education institutions? Is the discourse of university identity and the social function of the university sufficient to affirm the values and actions of the RSU?

The social critic Slavoj Zizek (quoted in Errejón, 2012) has said the following:

As is obvious [for this time], speeches are never presented in an orderly and cohesive way in reality. Its ability to penetrate and resonate in the "common sense" of the time has to do with its appeal to those concepts lived spontaneously as natural, positive and "apolitical" (p. 12).

Going to common sense, referring to the temporality of the university life of students: four or five years of professional training and putting in perspective that the bulk of the
student population begins their path in higher education institutions when they turn 18, The State, as we know it, legally legitimizes its political imprint and accreditation of citizens (of which it grants an identification card), which de facto implies the exercise of rights and subject to obligations enabled by the discourses and narratives of the documents, reforms and Civil agreements from which social justice flows, configured in public policies, which are forged, we say, in the ethics of “the good life”, in which the projects of civic life are inscribed.

Taking the above into account, what are those symbols of culture that mediate between vocation and professional training? Inside the university, in the educational act of higher education institutions, a moral political sense is usually affirmed, more legitimized by socialization and the prestige of being a university, accompanied by the mystification of the vocation or its gradual construction (which could provoke other studies), whose purposes impact on the dimensions of apprehension, acquisition and self-generation of knowledge. This moral, social and pedagogical flow points towards a “naturalized” disarticulation with the political and civic interdiscursiveness relational with the State (public policies and educational policies) that fractures the professional project, already inserted from the higher education institutions in the world of the broader life, which would constantly request the (re) construction and (re) significance of the symbolic network of political culture that weakens the maintenance of beliefs, opinions and common sense and ways of being “lived spontaneously”:

In this way of thinking, studying and explaining political phenomena, the senses cannot be taken for granted, the alignments for fossilized, or the results for eternal. It is a question, then, of capturing the movements that can alter institutionalized balances in order to modify them in one direction or another and measuring their possibilities of influence and the plausible effects of one or another displacement. (Errejón, 2012, p. 13).

The place of this disarticulation, (re) creates a void to rework meanings of the public sphere where the rights and obligations that validate the modes of citizen participation are exercised, inside and outside the institutions of higher education, whose interaction would invigorate a sense stronger for the vocational-training-professional political identity.

Although the practices and actions of the social function of the university are related to an extensionism, cooperation, scientific and humanistic contributions, linked to the community and society, the RSU requests to depart “from both the traditional solidarity
extension and a mere commitment unilateral declarative and force each university to question its epistemic assumptions and its hidden curriculum ”(Vallaeys, 2014, para. 1). From what the university autonomy would prove its relational character; however, these seem to settle in an apolitical or weak discursiveness, as we have described:

Political identities, the alignments that order the political field of a given society, are not derived in any way (...) from natural conditions, but are the result of practices under construction. Political analysis must be able to identify the main narratives or discourses that strive to explain social facts and produce, around them, one or another attitudes or compartments. It is a matter of isolating, from all that has been said, acted and generated, those devices that generate the most shared meanings, those that in practice orient more the political perceptions and evaluations of citizens (Errejón, 2012, p. 10).

The deliberate construction, emphasis on the interdiscursiveness of the political being-professionalization in relation to the political being-professional, requires its continuous updating in the university space. A configuration that would open the plots and actions of the ethical values of public policy to which we are asked in their doing, to build an identity of university political responsibility in maintaining a "self as another", of which we point out a change of meaning in the refiguration of the contents of the RSU as elements to be identified in the discursive analysis:

In this view, political change, far from being an anomaly, is a normal result, among other possible ones, of the dispute over the meaning and articulation of social groups in political subjects with projects related to public affairs. (Errejón, 2012, p. 10).

The void of an articulation has been discursivized when answering the first initial questions, with which the second was given way: what ethical and identity discourses for "the good life" would be available today for the interdiscursiveness of the educational act of higher education institutions? This seeks to broaden the coherence of a perspective now directed to the public-political space: its response continues to surround the internal need for its "availability" as a way of appearing for the educational subject and some identity construct in its own contingency: appearing citizen of university students, from the assumption and articulation of the exercise of a political being-doing-linked with the institutions: the State and the public university are conjectured, then.
Results

Narratives of the ethical subject

In the tone of this work, RSU is weighted as a way of caring for oneself in a political background of citizen democracy, which is why a critical reflection towards the who of the subjectivity of the yes to which it challenges (or seeks to challenge) the narratives of USR in the contemporary context of Mexican higher education institutions. This implies, in the first instance, going to an identification of the ontological-hermeneutical character of the subject (and his subjectivity) and his ways of appearing in the care of himself.

In his Hermeneutics of the subject, Michael Foucault (1994) traces the historical figures that in the West link the subject with the truth. This link defines it as relational, and more specifically, as power relations; relationships that, it supposes, mediate the governance of life (individual, of a family, of a community, of a State), configuring, historically, the modes of discourses of the ethical and moral space between subjects and institutions, the State.

In this way, it "shakes" the appearance of the (Western) political being in its power relations, where the violence of the (Cartesian) rationality of universal truths appears (as a device of knowledge); This is why the relationship with the rationality of the knowledge of the self-subject is weighed from the modern state, which is staked as res cogitans: the subject as an immutable essence in front of the objects of science to know them. And it is Nietzsche who reviled it as a deceptive truth: "We who know are unknown to ourselves" (Foucault, 1994, p. 13). For Foucault himself (1994), this ignorance of ourselves is to the detriment of the subject (of the order of Christian and scientific power relations) of the original practices of self-care, linked to the ethics of good citizenship, concern that privileges the “ethics of caring for oneself as a practice of freedom” (p. 13).

When Foucault (1994) questions "and why does one care about the truth, and also more about it than about oneself?" (p. 132), that "concern" that opens the question is referred not to the scientific knowledge of the self, but to the "epimeleia / cura sui": know yourself with the demand to take care of yourself in Western antiquity.

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12 “Con estas palabras iniciaba Friedrich Nietzsche el Prólogo de La genealogía de la moral escrito en Sils Maria en el verano de 1887” (Foucault, 1994, p. 13).
The concept is equivalent to a general attitude, a certain way of facing the world, a certain way of behaving, of establishing relationships with others. Epimeleia implies all this, it is an attitude, an attitude in relation to oneself, to others and to the world.

(…) The epimeleia heautou is is a certain form of attention, of gaze. Caring for yourself implies that you reconver your gaze and shift it from the outside, from the world, and from others, to yourself. Concern for oneself implies a certain form of vigilance over what one thinks and what happens in thought.

(…) It also designates a certain way of acting, a way of behaving that is exerted on oneself, through which one takes charge of oneself, is modified, purified, transformed or transfigured (Foucault, 1994, pp. 34-35).

Animated by an archeology of knowledge, the work of the intellectual seeks to challenge subjectivity and be, at the same time, challenged by ethical responsibility (Foucault, 1994, p. 9). To ethics, Foucault (1994) prescribes it thought of caring for himself, in which he has the possibility of playing his role as a citizen: questioning from his intellectual work and analytical praxis:

The job of an intellectual is not to shape the political will of others; rather, it lies in questioning, through the analyzes carried out in its own areas, the evidences and the postulates, in shaking the habits, the ways of acting and thinking, in dispelling the accepted familiarities, in resuming the measure of the rules and institutions and from this re-problematization (in which he develops his specific office of intellectual) participate in the formation of a political will (p. 9).

From this concept, Foucault (1994) argues a new ethics:

The point of articulation [be] between ethical concern and the political struggle for the respect of rights, of critical reflection against abusive government techniques, and of an ethic that allows the foundation of individual freedom (p. 139).

In reason and in accordance with these Foucauldian lines, the philosopher Judith Butler (2009) adds a critical component to the strength of morality during the production of the subject and in its deliberation to give an account of itself in the face of violence: a set of
norms that must negotiate in a vital and thoughtful way (p. 21). The author highlights Foucault's ethical subject its procedural character as self-realization in the practices of the self: “There is no creation of oneself (poiesis) apart from a mode of subjectivation or subjection and, therefore, neither self-realization with the presidency of the norms that configure the possible forms that a subject can adopt ”(Butler, 2009, p.31).

Now, according to Foucault (cited in Butler, 2009), self-assertion as an ethical subject is:

[A] process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will be the object of his moral practice (...). And this requires you to act on yourself, monitor yourself, test yourself, improve yourself and transform yourself. (…) Moral action is inseparable from these forms of self-activity (p. 32).

However, “that someone else undo me” by violence as a moral action “is to be exhorted to act, to challenge myself in another place and to abandon the self-sufficient 'me' considered as a kind of possession” (Butler, 2009, p. 183). Without a doubt, Butler refers to that possession that is self-described as immutable in the face of the ignorance of ourselves that Nietzsche already warned about.

From this perspective, it remains to be seen if a university subject (individual or collective) that, when challenged by the discourses and narratives of the moral culture of Mexican society (in its axial and hierarchical organization with the State), refers to a certain (of ) gradation of significance and sense of "supervising, testing, improving and transforming" in the discourse of USR, which would be related to the ways of being-appearing of university students as ethical subjects and their self-care practices.

**Identity narratives**

It will be a priority to guide “the availability” of ethical discourses for the “good life” and to articulate their thematization with the construct of identities in the contemporary socio-historical context of the contents of the USR. This taking into consideration the following:

When we talk about the issue of identities, it is essential to specify which aspects of them we are referring to (...) because fundamentally the identity aspects and processes have a multipurpose dimension (...) and [because the issue of identities] has experienced in recent years a certain trivialization from
the reiteration of common places (…) in the contemporary socio-historical context (Téllez, 2001, p. 5).

Reflecting on “the identity question”, the anthropologist Ricardo Téllez Girón López (2001) warns that the points of view on the subject of identities have been modified according to the variations that have occurred over time and that the theoretical referents have altered with the the analyzes are developed.

In the circles of those who have responsibility for public affairs, in the same academic circles and, even more so, in the opinion of broad social sectors, the tendency to mystify these issues [identities] is greater than could be imagined (Téllez, 2001, p. 5).

Such mystification places emphasis on "alleged essential, immutable identities, which would be at the base of the explanation of such confrontations" (Téllez, 2001, p. 7).

In this regard, Frederic Barth (cited in Téllez, 2001), with a relational approach, leads to a more significant contribution: “Identity is not something natural but rather a dynamic process in which social operations take place in an incessant way to maintain or modify a specific identity ”(p. 8). From this relational and interactionist approach, he continues, identity can only be analyzed and interpreted from the relationship between the social actors in contact. In addition, it has an intersubjective and relational character. "The individual recognizes himself only by recognizing himself in the other" (Barth, cited in Téllez, 2001, p. 8). It should be noted that cultural differences (and their symbolic network) are a consequence of the interaction and connections established by the groups themselves “as elaborate constructions for identity”. Thus, the identity is transformed by the involvement, contact and exchanges between human conglomerates.

From this relational approach, the identity question with social anthropology places points of encounter (and disagreement) of an intersubjective nature in which the individual recognizes himself only from the recognition in the other and demands a dynamism, during life, related to situations and contexts, not immutable for identity, but differentiated in their own identity limits. Following Barth (cited in Tellez, 2011): the need to maintain identities operates from limits on which differentiation rests. Consequently, there is a constant "negotiation" between the actors, asserts the anthropologist.

This negotiation would be analogous to the narrative of (re) conciliation with identifications and meanings in the symbolic network of culture, which would give meaning
to identity as “my body that enunciates”, in a time and place, who am I with, for and among the others.

For her part, the philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2014) affirms that “all societies are full of emotions” (p.13). It also underlines the importance of love over justice. However, it specifies that these emotions, in the public space, have manifested as speeches encouraged by fear, guilt, envy, distrust, but also as emotional alliances of sympathy “what an individual feels when he is a participant in the passion of the other” (Nussbaum, 2014. p.14)

It can be observed (not without some difficulty of theoretical debts between the psychology of the self and moral philosophy) that historically these emotions "adhere to the political field" as narrative prefigurations that give meaning (nuanced, concealed or pure) to who participates, who or what is included, who can be the same, who different. These are pseudo-responses that are tritely sought in the enormous guarantee of the reproduction of the socio-economic system (local, national and now planetary), whose target is right in the discursive and narrative configuration, no longer of values as a foundation, but of values. ethical evaluations of a political culture of citizenship that has lost sight, on the one hand, of the right to freedoms of belonging to a nation-state and, on the other, has caused an identity deformation constructed by such political emotions.

What, then, is the meeting point, the intersubjectivity, the self-identification, the interdiscursiveness of the political identity of the university students that we seek? How could the appearance of an identity linked to the public, democratic and citizen nature of vocational training projects be proven?

**Personal identity**

Rather, the expression is linked to a linguistic usage, according to which "the word" has a collective meaning and implies a social relationship. The word that is said to one, also the word that is granted or that someone says referring to a promise: “is the word”, all of this does not refer only to the individual word, and even when it is only a affirmative word, of a yes, says more, infinitely more than I could "beli

To elucidate the previous questions, whose background continues to be the dynamic character of identity, of that individual or person who recognizes himself "only by recognizing himself in the other", or in the words of Nussbaum, "what an individual feels
when he is participant in the passion of the other” (Nussbaum, 2014, p. 14), the theoretical reference of the narrative identity of anthropological philosophy is retaken, which, with Paul Ricoeur, has its highest point in the recognition of oneself as other. Such recognition comes on account of the descriptive-narrative-prescriptive character of the "I" of the enunciation, which when enunciated describes, narrates and prescribes the world of life, becoming identity of the who: of the "who am" in the interstice of temporality that it would request Barth’s “negotiation” (cited in Tellez, 2011) towards the Aristotelian eudemonia: “the good life with and for others in just institutions” by Ricoeur.

For Ricoeur (2006), the hermeneutics of the self has its origin in a double articulation of the self of the enunciation, widely disputed by the philosophy of language (symbolic logic), semantics (referentiality) and pragmatics (acts of language). The hermeneutics of the self seeks its way out from these considerations by building a hermeneutical circle for personal identity, whose interpretation is only accessible in the narrative identity13 that describes, narrates and prescribes the actions of the self in language as discourse.

**Primacy of ipse identity**

The Ricoeurean identity of the reference to the self, to the who, is articulated in the sameness, idem: myself, the identical in relation to the different from me that is consolidated with the immutable of the character, the genetic coding, the identification of a name between the names, the dated birth; and ipseity, ipse, which in the construction of identity, in the permanence of time, points to the other, the strange, the otherness: the psychological terrain of impressions, desires and beliefs (Ricoeur, 2003).

For Ricoeur (2003), ipseity-ipse puts in identity “a complementary dialectic of ipseity and sameness, that is, the dialectic of the self and the other other than itself. As long as the circle of identity-sameness remains, the alterity of any other other than itself does not offer anything original ”(Ricoeur, 2006, p. XIII). Simply, a different, different or opposite of me. Otherness with ipseity is not a comparison but an implication of "oneself in relation to another."

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13 La identidad personal se plantea entre la filosofía analítica y la hermenéutica como capaz de deducirla. La identidad ligada a la temporalidad es la identidad narrativa que proviene de la identidad personal que funda criterios objetivos de identificación. El concepto de acción es la narración. La acción narrada se iguala con el concepto del “hombre que actúa y que sufre” (Ricoeur, 2006, p. XXX) y ahí se implica con determinaciones éticas y morales de la acción, relacionadas con las categorías de lo bueno y lo obligatorio. La dialéctica de la ipseidad como un sí mismo como otro pone el acento filosófico en su enlace ético (Ricoeur, 2006).
Is that relational character\textsuperscript{14} which leads Barth's anthropological individual (cited in Tellez, 2011) to a more significant contribution; an incessant dialectic between selfhood and selfhood that is actualized in social operations to maintain or modify a specific identity. It is the ipseity, of Ricoeur's hermeneutic of the yes, which comes and goes to the same; ipseity that is affirmed in the “given word”, in the care, esteem and self-respect. The "given word" is reaffirmed in the promise of the who who enunciates it in the present to keep it in the future and that, beyond an act of performative language, remains as self-care in time to come, as life always in project. In this sense, we would say that the promise of the projects of the “good life” is narrativized with the identity-ipse in the making.

The narrative identity would have in the RSU its productivity in the enunciation of the ethical evaluations where the university life projects are inscribed, narrativized by the people, the community, the society and the culture; and at the limit of institutions, the State, which also narrates its political discourses through the laws and the administration of justice, with which the identity of human beings is confronted and configured in historical contexts.

Here it is also possible to think of a subject in process (Foucault) who today is enunciated in the USR project located as a biopolitical man\textsuperscript{15}, and that for Gómez (2017) constitutes its indexicality \textsuperscript{16}(p. 152) in which he legitimizes the ontological appearance of his discourses:

Generic man, man, woman, is undoubtedly the main object and subject of what the university does and not because of a simple humanistic vocation of the university, but because of the scientific and social interest of its occurrence and its occurrence, in which its indexicality\textsuperscript{17}, in other words, its political dimension, its public policy and its internal relations (Gómez, 2017, p. 152).

\textsuperscript{14} Irreductibles pero solapadas (no antinómicas), la mismidad recubre a la ipseidad. La identidad \textit{idem} constituye el grado más elevado en la permanencia en el tiempo “al que se opone lo diferente, en el sentido de cambiante, variable (...). El ipse no implica ninguna afirmación sobre un pretendido núcleo no cambiante de la personalidad” (Ricoeur, 2006, p. XIII), pero aporta modalidades propias de identidad: fragiliza y pone en riesgo la existencia de un yo permanente e inmutable en el tiempo a través de la temporalidad existencial (Ricoeur, 2016).

\textsuperscript{15} Siguiendo a Foucault, nos dice Gómez (2017), “la experiencia biopolítica de ser sujeto y cuerpo individual, de ser, al mismo tiempo, cuerpo social”.

\textsuperscript{16} Calidad y ordenación del locus discursivo donde “se articula la legitimación de su hacer, de sus prácticas cotidianas y comunes, de sus recursos teóricos, intelectuales, éticos y estéticos, de su normatividad jurídico-académica, de sus permisiones y sus transgresiones, de sus rupturas, a veces como “desviaciones” de sentido, o como falsos caminos, a veces como descubrimientos inéditos, “iluminaciones súbitas” o aperturas de nuevos prolíficos y promisorios horizontes de saber y de conocimiento (Gómez, 2017, p. 152)

\textsuperscript{17} Calidad y ordenación del locus discursivo donde “se articula la legitimación de su hacer, de sus prácticas cotidianas y comunes, de sus recursos teóricos, intelectuales, éticos y estéticos, de su normatividad jurídico-
Esteem and self-respect in democracy

Even when morality provides a set of norms that produce a subject in its intelligibility, it does not stop being a set of norms and rules that must be negotiated in a vital and reflective way. (Butler, 2009, p. 21).

Detached from the prescriptive field of Kantian philosophy, morality is normative (nomos) and makes judgments, punishments or rewards on the good and evil of the actions imputed to someone: a person, a group, a society, an institution, guarded (regulated or legally coerced) by the tacit and universal observance of its categorical imperative: "Each one acts according to the rule that he could wish to become universal law" (Philosophy in Spanish, nd). A challenge that challenges.

From the critical scope of the narratives and discourses that moral philosophy prescribes, and apart from Nietzsche whereas moral interpellation “only” as a way of confessional (legal) response for fear of punishment and attachment to ethical responsibility as revenge for justice, Butler (2009) again, in a contemporary context for practical philosophy, proposes that the moral interpellation coming from the other or the other towards me, towards us, is expressed as “a desire to know and understand, a desire to explain” (Butler, 2009, p. 23), an “account of oneself”, which appeals to voice and narrative authority "directed to an audience for purposes of persuasion" and to assume responsibility for one's own acts through that medium. Butler finds that the narration (the word, the voice, the discourse) stems from the desire to grant recognition to the "self" and to the other so as not to get caught up in a "fight against the norms" (Nietzsche's denial of Kant as an individualistic or narcissistic moral - hidden selfishness -), but as a vital, critical and reflective question between ethical violence (struggle of the moral subject) and the responsibility of inhabiting the world as an “giving account of oneself same ”(narrative). Drinking from T. W. Adorno (cited in Butler, 2009), this vitality:

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18 La genealogía de la moral.
19 Donde el silencio expresa una resistencia a la interpelación, como no digna de respuesta. “En esos casos, el silencio pone en cuestión la legitimidad de la autoridad invocada por la pregunta y el interrogador, o bien intenta circunscribir un dominio de autonomía en el que este último no puede o no debe inmiscuirse” (Butler, 2009, p. 24).
20 Esto en la perspectiva crítica de la filosofía moral y ética, que Butler sigue a través de los textos de F. Nietzsche, T. W. Adorno y M. Foucault reseñados en el libro que estamos tratando.
It makes no sense to refer in an abstract way to principles that govern behavior (...). We are responsible not only for the purity of our soul, but for the shape of the world we all inhabit." (p. 150)

With the critical contributions "explained and conjectured" so far, it endorses a responsible subject immersed, vital and active both in the field of ethics and in that of practical philosophy, where actions are estimated and valued according to the good (there is no bad ethics) that there is in justice, the highest virtue of human coexistence.

The original principle or initial source of order alludes to authority, that is, to which it sustains itself, and consequently does not depend on the governed (subjects), the kratos, as power (potestas), is a derived from authority, although at this level the possibility that this power may come, in a representative logic, from the governed (who, therefore, cease to be simply subjects and become citizens) remains open. (Ávalos, 2016, p. 187).

The policy is "the reasoned activity of coexistence subject to rules" (Ávalos, 2016, p. 186), and the observance of the procedures and decision-making that it raises is of a public nature.21

With the hermeneutics of the yes, the freedom of action (not free will) of people is exercised in morality through respect for oneself with others, which passes through the morality of the norm as a given word. However, with all moral failure, among the wide spectrum between omissions and normative infractions of the law, ethics violates equity, the heart of justice, to which the "good life" aspires as regards itself as another, in Ricoeur's thought.

With respect to coexistence, observance and public character, the concept of democracy proposed by Ávalos (2016) is similar to that of the Aristotelian ethics that Ricoeur already referred to approximates:22 "The good life with and for others in just institutions", since coexistence and observance would be actions of "the given word" that are sustained in

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21 “El establecimiento de esas normas y su observancia plantea inmediatamente la cuestión referida al procedimiento de constitución del gobierno con poder de decisión (potestas) de los principales asuntos públicos que son, mínimamente, el de la guerra y la paz, el de obtención y distribución de los recursos materiales comunes, el de la determinación de la trasgresión y la pena, el de la designación de los gobernantes y el del modo de gobierno” (Ávalos, 2014, p. 187).

22 Ricoeur busca el quién de la acción a través de la identidad narrativa, haciendo la distinción sobre las filosofías del sujeto que se disputan entre el cogito cartesiano, un yo empírico o como yo trascendental y busca la intersubjetividad más que un yo en posición de fuerza o debilitado (nietzscheano).
a democratic life with and among others, and that validates its public character in the life of institutions. In relation to the subjection of norms, procedures and decision making, democracy makes us participants in its discourses and narratives as we build precisely our political identity; a habit validated in permanent reflection: ethics understood "as the part of philosophy in charge of reflecting on the habitual ways of dwelling in the world" (Ávalos, 2016, p. 201).

It has been said that narrative identity (and more properly, ipseity) is the place that Ricoeur privileges in the hermeneutics of the self to account for ethical evaluations such as self-esteem and the moral field, self-respect. It will be the who of democracy, of moral imputation, of the ethical request of the RSU, which, as a reasoned activity in its own narrative, acquires its public character. With the (conscious) construction of political identity and its spaces for articulation in the university (now occupied by RSU) it is that university students can reflect, question and critically negotiate the democratic life of the institutions, their ethical and normative character, where professional life projects are included and take shape: in and from the university institution in its dynamic relationship with the social and citizen environment.

**Narratives of university citizenship**

To linger in something instead of going quickly through the texts harvesting information is, in truth, an art that is disappearing. (…) Everything that is not to enter from the language in what aroused by it, is to babble, to speak brokenly, to spell. So speech requires understanding, understanding of the word that is being said. Also from the word itself. (Gadamer, 1998, p. 69).

The fragility of the political identity in the limits of the institutions, the State and the citizenship would be related to the political foundations of the conscious identification of their discourses, symbols and narratives. However, there is an excess that would have to do with broader holdings and patterns of belonging, which are perceived only in the social imaginary, where the identity of care, esteem and self-respect as another, the heart of democracy, distance themselves from the magnitude and significance of the problems that are experienced in contemporary times:
The question of social conflicts that have a basis in social identities or in their manipulation, the management of identity processes by political power, discrimination in discourses, the size reached by cultural industries and the impact that these have in the processes of cultural homogenization, migration, marginality (extreme poverty where living conditions are aggravated), the process of globalization, globalization and (...) the impact of this phenomenon on the cultures of the peoples in contact and the consequent repercussion on identity processes, become significant (Téllez, 2001, p. 14).

In this (de) naturalized distancing for other contemporary identities of citizenship (or are they not?) A broader critique of ethical and moral intentionality can be poured, from which a negotiation of university political identities is “requested”, of "The word given" in the promise, of the future implication that can "modify the culture in its temporality, in its historical context or transform the political culture" (Téllez, 2001, p. 7). Despite the fact that the imaginary of the political always appears to be traversed by difficulties and tensions that weaken an identity negotiation or a commitment to action and deliberation, it is necessary for the political to legitimize itself beyond the ideologies and mystifications of conflicts, always changing and relative.

Although the expansion of the political sphere implies power relations, these must be models “based on a greater or lesser force, legitimacy and positive character that the group grants to itself, compared to what is perceived from the outside (...) social actors are considered substantial to be recognized and recognized, to identify and be identified (Téllez, 2001, p. 11).

These identity relations must be taken into account, made aware, to strengthen the weakly political, where the idea of a liberation (and not of democracy) that is established in the "benefits" and the benefit of the essentiality of politics haunts: static of historical immutability that, in the public harangue, takes voice with speeches (texts and images) reproduced, void of ethicality: politics does not change, politics is demagoguery, politics is power at all costs, politics is manipulation. These experiences would question here the lack of an explanation and understanding of identity discourses in some political sense for "oneself";
One has to wonder if any stagnation in understanding oneself - which is probably one of the basic experiences that give us food for thought - will not always be a delayed arrival at oneself. (Gadamer, 1998, p. 70).

It will be necessary to urgently rebuild the narratives and discourses of university identity in their ways of being, appearing and acting, prioritizing the importance in (re)formations, of political structures and also in the production of political discourses, where the Citizen identities, as has been seen, are not alien to power relations.

We start from the idea that performative discourses are a particular form of social action and it is necessary to build [from the university] this analytical device that accounts not only for their order, but also fundamentally for their impacts among the actors and their strategic positions and tacit within the university and its relationship with society (Gómez, 2017, p. 144).

Otherwise, the ethical contents of the RSU program, in the field of educational policies of higher education institutions, “would arrive late” to the contemporary imaginary of an always latent ethicity for the understanding of “oneself” as a university student; Usually uncritical and insufficient understanding due to the diminished, delayed, or exacerbated opinion of the citizen imaginary for the construction and participation of public policies from the university.

It is said that the university, in its ethical pretensions, can be a space for “correction” of State policies, which rather translates into a space for criticism, without guarantee of influence, beyond the university itself and, in some cases, certain operational spheres of society are warned, through public opinion, through the media and through social and cyber networks (Gómez 2017, p. 149).

Its political implication must pass from its imaginary character to a manifest enunciation: my body that enunciates, in a time and place, a university I am that extends through language as action to an I want, I can, I narrate, I I am responsible, as care, esteem and respect for being a university student in and between the world, that distances itself from all essentiality when reflecting on the symbolic and polysemic character of the political culture network, where the different identities that clamorly request “coexist” the good life with and for others in just institutions ”.
It cannot be denied that, even more forcefully for this millennium, the identity processes associated with vocation, professions, professionalization, work and the labor field have been directed at the planetary level (their discursiveness with others in the world) by the media and technology and the “consequent globalization of cultural flows” that, through the diffusion of media products, however, is linked “with a space, a society and a social group (local, regional, national, of class, etc.)” and that “it has an undeniable influence at the national level that affects the entire population and its own cultural and creative expressions” (Téllez, 2001, pp. 40-41).

Despite the enormous disparities between traditional professions and other hegemonic professions of the media market (exercised by the logic of the current domain market), the reworking of identity meanings for a broader university political culture, which encompasses difficulties, tensions and the magnitude and transcendence of the social problems that are experienced in contemporaneity, would move away from a democratic autism and the alienation of "the same" (what does not change) political. Knowing about it can weaken the anguish of the imaginary through an educational praxis with university responsibility, closer to a political democracy, and not be driven by economic interests, or have them as latent idealizations of the professional, of the professional and of work as a permanent need for social belonging.

With the immersion in renewed and volatile cultural flows, the erosion of personal identity towards a planetary under construction has occurred, still lacking criticism or reflection, for the ethical transfiguration of the human in a reality that is already perceived as fragmented, where each person responds with his individuality, with his unknown self, or legitimizing before others the violence of his silence: “In those cases, silence calls into question the legitimacy of the authority invoked by the question and the interrogator, or as a domain of autonomy in which it should not interfere” (Butler, 2009, p. 24). It still seems that this human being that we are continues to ask about some kind of social belonging in public culture.

The university as a "public space of discursive, conceptual, political, ideological and philosophical confrontations" makes possible the emotional experience of promise, of the word given for university social responsibility: the word that gives life to democracy and justice before "the perception of fellow citizens as inhabitants with whom a common public space is shared” (Nussbaum, 2014, p. 14). Explain and understand through the performative
action of the discourses, “negotiate” identities, deconstruct idealizations and sterile symbols of university autonomy, assume oneself in the narratives of citizenship giving an account of oneself, make political evaluations as practices of self-care, seek the interpellation of vocation, professionalization, all of this to appropriate life projects.

In more technical terms that does not detract from its wealth, USR launched from a reindexicalization that gives way to a “defense of the university” and its autonomy: that seeks, among others, to account for the events / happenings of the world in a criticism, of new discourses, of thinking and being thought before the crisis of their exhaustion (Gómez, 2017, p.166). Or as Nussbaum (2014) asserts, to seek “a cog of understanding” between stability and tensions for an emotionally, ethically and politically significant life.

Every society needs to reflect on the stability of its political culture over time and on the security of the values most appreciated by it in times of tension, justice being a form of love, the public emotion that must prevail for equality and the inclusion (Nussbaum, 2014, p. 16).

However:
Not anchored in the idea of human dignity but through an understanding gear of “how it matters, how it could be ordered, how an emotional experience is lived, how emotional development in justice can have a politically significant life (Nussbaum, 2014, p. 459).

The implications of a vigorous university citizenship for RSU would be, then, in the question of that who; his response, an incessant narrative and discursive reconfiguration of public space that validates the appropriation of the Aristotelian ethos: “the good life with and for others in just institutions”.

**Conclusions**

In the voice of Gadamer (1998), speech made of words can only be true or false in the opinion expressed about a state of affairs. This has configured six narratives portrayed as intermediate categories of analysis that have guided the epistemological path to find a meaning thematized by USR that can be added, from anthropological, social, and political philosophy, to educational research within the framework of educational institutions Mexican superior.
In particular, going to the articulation of narrative identity has made it possible to make specific ethical and moral evaluations with which individual and collective subjects "are weaving" continuously and intertwined (poiesis) stories, stories, discourses, texts, narratives that mediate and define the political events of the institutions and the State in the world of life. The training of educational subjects in the integration of professional projects in the university space deserves a critical reflection on the who of being a university student, transforming in parallel into co-citizens, appropriately committed to politics: privileging the understanding of "the good life with and for others in just institutions "as an act of deliberation towards the habitual ways of dwelling in the world of institutions.

The ethical dimensions of the yes in its political configuration propose to exercise democracy as a guarantee of being vigilant of self-esteem and self-respect in order to respond to the decisions, options or choices that challenge the who of USR. Belonging to that socially and politically experienced world requires a reconfiguration of public identity with the State; to strip the university self of its "naturalization" and avoid its contemporary fragmentation.

The RSU program requests the organization of an ethically livable world based on the inclusion of all identities inside and outside the university, away from the ghosts and inventions of others, between the coagulations of tradition and planetary contemporaneity.

The ethical behavior of university students anticipates the need for the construction of identities based on the values of university autonomy, where the highest value of democratic responsibility would be. It is necessary to deal with specific spaces and activities from the social disciplines and the humanities that account for the discourses and narratives of the self-realization of the educational subject that today would occupy ways of thinking and joint reflection for political coexistence in permanent refuge of the humanitas de the university, "of the most noble and defensible of man, of his right to be a person."
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